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FM WASHINGTON

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NATO CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL FROM WASHINGTON

SUBJECT: POLITICAL ANALYSIS: WARSAW PACT DECLARATION

STRESSES EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

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1. AFTER A HIATUS OF MORE THAN TWO YEARS, THE WARSAW
PACT'S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE (PCC) MET IN
BUCHAREST ON NOVEMBER 25-26 AND ADOPTED A DECLARATION
FEATURING AN ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE AIMED AT CSCE SIGNA-

TORIES AND AN AGREEMENT BY THE PCC TO REGULARIZE THE PACT'S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY REGARDED THE CONVOCAION OF THE PCC AND ITS SHOW OF UNITY AS A SUCCESS. THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO EXPLOIT THE RESULTS FOR FURTHER INITIATIVES AIMED AT BOTH THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO BE HELD IN BELGRADE IN 1977 AND THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION.

2. THE DECLARATION CONTAINED:

(A)--A PROPOSAL THAT CSCE SIGNATORY STATES CONCLUDE A TREATY PROHIBITING THE FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST ONE ANOTHER, SUGGESTING THAT THE TREATY MIGHT BE A LOGICAL FOLLOW-UP TO THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, SIGNED IN HELSINKI LAST YEAR;

(B)--A SUGGESTION THAT ARTICLE 9 OF THE WARSAW PACT TREATY AND ARTICLE 10 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, WHICH ALLOW THE ACCESSION OF NEW MEMBERS, BE SUSPENDED, AN APPARENT PLOY TO COUNTER THE POSSIBILITY OF SPAIN'S ENTRY INTO NATO; AND

(C)--A DECISION BY THE PCC TO CREATE, SUBORDINATE TO ITSELF, A COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS AND A JOINT SECRETARIAT AS A MEANS "TO CONTINUE AND EXPAND EFFECTIVE COOPERATION" IN THE FOREIGN POLICY FIELD.

3. THE MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY PARTY CHIEFS, HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, AND FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE USSR, BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GDR, HUNGARY, POLAND, AND ROMANIA. THE SOVIETS' AVOIDANCE OF CONTENTIOUS ISSUES AND FORMULATIONS NO DOUBT ENSURED THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE DECLARATION TO ALL PACT MEMBERS, ESPECIALLY ROMANIA, WHICH FOR YEARS HAS OPPOSED SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO "COORDINATE" THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF PACT COUNTRIES.

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4. PROPOSAL ON NO FIRST-USE AIMED AT CSCE MEETING IN BELGRADE:

5. THE PCC DECLARATION, WITH ITS EXPLICITLY EUROPEAN THRUST, PROBABLY FORESHADOWS THE PACT'S STRATEGY FOR THE FOLLOW-UP CSCE MEETING TO BE HELD IN BELGRADE IN JUNE 1977. THE FLOATING OF A DRAFT TREATY ON NO FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ADDRESSED TO CSCE STATES SUGGESTS THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT USE SUCH A TREATY AT BELGRADE TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE WEST'S EMPHASIS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT, ESPECIALLY BASKET III. CONTINUED SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN DEFENSIVENESS OVER IMPLEMENTATION WAS CLEARLY VISIBLE IN THE DECLARATION'S CHARACTERIZATION

ONCE AGAIN OF WESTERN COMPLAINTS ON THE EAST'S IMPLEMENTATION RECORD AS "INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS." SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THIS REGARD WERE SIGNALLED BY THE PCC COMMUNIQUE, WHICH NOTED THAT THE TEXTS OF THE DECLARATION AND THE DRAFT TREATY WERE TO BE SENT TO ALL CSCE STATES.

6. THE PROPOSAL ON "NO FIRST-USE" OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS NOT NEW--THROUGHOUT THE 1960S IT HAD BEEN PART OF MOSCOW'S DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY. IN 1972, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS ADVANCED A POSITION IN THE UN WHICH COMBINED A "NON-USE OF FORCE" PLEDGE WITH A "NON-USE" OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMMITMENT. THE EFFECT OF THIS COMBINATION WAS TO RECOGNIZE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST AN ATTACK WITH CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND THEREBY COUNTER WESTERN OBJECTIONS TO PREVIOUS SOVIET PROPOSALS ON "NO FIRST-USE." THE 1972 SOVIET PROPOSAL ALSO LEFT THE USSR WITH THE OPTION OF USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIRST IN THE EVENT OF A CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE. IT PARALLELED OTHER EVIDENCE AT THE TIME THAT THE SOVIETS WERE GIVING MORE THOUGHT TO FLEXIBILITY IN NUCLEAR STRATEGY.

7. IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS YEAR, THE SOVIETS SUBMITTED A DRAFT TREATY ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE WITHOUT A "NO FIRST-USE" PROVISION, POSSIBLY INTENDING TO REINTRODUCE IT IN THE PCC DECLARATION IN A MORE LIMITED CONTEXT. THUS, THE PRESENT APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSAL ON

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"NO FIRST-USE" TO CSCE STATES REFLECTS NOT ONLY THE SOVIETS' STRESS IN THE PCC DECLARATION ON SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT AS A WHOLE, BUT ALSO THEIR PERSISTENT EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE NATO'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY. ITS APPLICATION TO CSCE STATES WAS PROBABLY ALSO MOTIVATED BY THE SOVIETS' CONCERN FOR THE PRESERVATION OF A NUCLEAR OPTION VIS-A-VIS CHINA.

8. THE FACT THAT THE PCC'S PROPOSAL FOR NO FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS ONCE AGAIN DIVORCED FROM THE NON-USE OF FORCE CONCEPT--AND THUS FROM THE IMPLICATION THAT USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST AGGRESSION WITH CONVENTIONAL FORCES WOULD BE LEGITIMATE--MARKS IT AS LESS FORTHCOMING TOWARD NATO THAN EARLIER PROPOSALS. THIS SUGGESTS THAT THE PROPOSAL IS INTENDED MORE FOR PROPAGANDA THAN FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATION.

9. OTHER ISSUES: STANDARD SOVIET POSITIONS WITH SOME NUANCES:

10. IN REFERENCES TO NON-EUROPEAN AREAS AND ISSUES THE DECLARATION BROKE NO REALLY NEW GROUND BUT DID CONTAIN A

FEW NUANCES.

(A)--THE SECTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST IN EFFECT ENDORSED THE OCTOBER 1, 1976, SOVIET PROPOSAL TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE (INCLUDING A CALL FOR AN END TO THE STATE OF WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES).

(B)--THE PASSAGE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA WAS NOTEWORTHY FOR ITS PLEDGE OF SUPPORT NOT ONLY TO THE ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS BUT ALSO TO THE "SOUTH AFRICAN PEOPLES IN THEIR SELFLESS STRUGGLE" AGAINST COLONIALISM AND RACISM.

(C)--OTHER PASSAGES URGED "FURTHER EFFORTS" TO ACHIEVE "ACCEPTABLE" ACCORDS IN THE MBFR TALKS IN VIENNA AND REITERATED BREZHNEV'S 1975 PROPOSAL FOR INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES ON ENERGY, TRANSPORTATION, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, OFFERING MOSCOW AS A SITE FOR ONE OF THEM.

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11. PROPOSED FREEZE ON ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIPS A NEW TWIST:

12. THE DECLARATION'S SUGGESTION FOR A "SUSPENSION" IN THE EXPANSION OF MEMBERSHIP IN BOTH THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO REPRESENTS A NEW TWIST IN THE PACT'S BASIC POSITION, EMBODIED IN THE 1955 TREATY, OF FAVORING DISBANDMENT OF THE ALLIANCES. SINCE 1969 THE PACT HAD CALLED FOR THE ABOLITION OF THE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS OF THE ALLIANCES AS A "FIRST STEP" TOWARD DISBANDMENT;

13. WHILE PROBABLY CALCULATED MAINLY TO HINDER ANY WESTERN PLANS TO BRING SPAIN INTO NATO, THE PCC'S SUGGESTION FOR A FREEZE ON ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIPS MAY HAVE OTHER IMPLICATIONS. THE SOVIETS COULD ALSO HAVE BEEN HINTING AT:

(A)--A TRADE-OFF, IMPLYING THAT IN THE POST-TITO PERIOD THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT PRESSURE YUGOSLAVIA TO JOIN THE PACT IF SPAIN WERE KEPT OUT OF NATO; OR

(B)--A HANDS-OFF-YUGOSLAVIA POLICY, I.E., THAT YUGOSLAVIA NOT BE ALLOWED TO JOIN EITHER ALLIANCE. HOWEVER, THE PROSPECT OF YUGOSLAVIA'S CONSIDERING JOINING EITHER ALLIANCE SEEMS DIM.

14. THE PROPOSED FREEZE COULD, IN EFFECT, ALSO PRECLUDE THE ENTRY INTO THE WARSAW PACT OF CUBA AND MONGOLIA, AMONG OTHER "SOCIALIST" STATES. THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR ENTRY, WHILE REMOTE, HAS BEEN SUGGESTED BY NUMEROUS SOVIET STATEMENTS PROJECTING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WARSAW PACT TREATY "BEYOND THE CONFINES OF EUROPE"--IMPLIED IN SOME

OF THE SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE TREATIES AS WELL--AND IN THE GENERAL LISTING OF COUNTRIES COMPRISING THE "FRATERNAL SOCIALIST STATES." SIGNIFICANTLY, THE DECLARATION CALLED FOR "ALL-ROUND AND EQUAL COOPERATION" WITH "SOCIALIST STATES" NOT MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT--A MORE LIMITED SCOPE THAN ROMANIA'S OFFICIALLY EXPRESSED INTENTION OF IMPROVING BILATERAL POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONS WITH "SOCIALIST" STATES OUTSIDE THE PACT AS WELL AS WITH "OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES."

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15. COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS; JOINT SECRETARIAT:

16. BOTH THE PCC COMMUNIQUE AND THE DECLARATION NOTED THAT A "DECISION WAS ADOPTED ON FOUNDING THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTERS AND THE JOINT SECRETARIAT" AS BODIES OF THE PCC. THE CREATION OF THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS TO EXPAND "COOPERATION" IN THE FOREIGN POLICY FIELD--SOMEWHAT AKIN TO THE COMMITTEE OF DEFENSE MINISTERS SET UP IN 1969 TO FURTHER MILITARY COLLABORATION--PROBABLY REFLECTS A COMPROMISE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ROMANIANS, WHO FOR OVER A DECADE HAVE BEEN FENDING OFF SOVIET EFFORTS TO "COORDINATE" FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES ON A REGULAR BASIS AMONG PACT MEMBERS AT THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS LEVEL. WHILE THE ROMANIANS CLAIM TO FAVOR THE NEW COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS AS CONSISTENT WITH THEIR OWN DESIRE TO AFFORD GREATER EMPHASIS TO THE POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE PACT, THEY CERTAINLY WILL REMAIN WARY OF ITS POTENTIAL USE BY THE SOVIETS TO EFFECT POLICY COORDINATION AND WILL PRESUMABLY INSIST THAT ALL DECISIONS REQUIRE UNANIMITY AND BE REFERRED BACK TO CAPITALS FOR APPROVAL.

17. THE REFERENCE IN THE DECLARATION TO THE "CREATION" OF A JOINT SECRETARIAT IS NOT ALTOGETHER CLEAR. THE PCC DECIDED TO ESTABLISH SUCH AN ORGAN IN 1956, TO BE STAFFED BY NATIONALS FROM PACT COUNTRIES. IT WAS TO BE HEADED BY A SECRETARY GENERAL AND IS IN FACT PRESENTLY HEADED BY N. P. FIRYUBIN, A SOVIET FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER. WHILE FIRYUBIN HAS OCCUPIED THAT POSITION SINCE AT LEAST 1966, THE STAFF APPEARS TO HAVE BECOME MORIBUND OVER THE YEARS, IF IT EVER EXISTED. THUS, THE SOVIETS MAY NOW HAVE DECIDED TO RESUSCITATE IT, PERHAPS AS A COUNTERPART TO THE PACT'S JOINT STAFF, WHICH IN 1969 JOINED THE COMMITTEE OF DEFENSE MINISTERS IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE PACT. HOWEVER, THE EFFECT OF THE SECRETARIAT'S PRESUMED ROLE IN EXPEDITING FOREIGN POLICY "COOPERATION" REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

18. BASIC INTRA-PACT POSITIONS UNALTERED:

19. THE PCC DECLARATION REVEALED NO BASIC CHANGES IN
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INTRA-PACT RELATIONS OR POSITIONS. ANTICIPATED SOVIET
PRESSURE FOR GREATER ROMANIAN PARTICIPATION IN PACT
MILITARY ACTIVITIES--PARTICULARLY IN JOINT TROOP
MANEUVERS--APPARENTLY NEVER MATERIALIZED THIS YEAR.
THE PRESUMED COMPROMISE ON THE CREATION OF A COMMITTEE
OF FOREIGN MINISTERS--SUBORDINATE TO THE PCC--MAY HAVE
BEEN ACCEPTED BY ROMANIA TO PRECLUDE PRESSURE FOR MILI-
TARY COOPERATION. THIS WOULD APPEAR TO MEET SOVIET
DESIRES FOR GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT IN ROMANIAN-PACT
RELATIONS.

20. THERE WERE NO HINTS OF ANY POSSIBLE REVISION OF THE
PACT TREATY--WHICH ON OCCASION HAS LOOMED AS A POSSIBILITY
IN LIGHT OF SOME OF ITS DATED PROVISIONS. THE DECLARATION
CONSPICUOUSLY AVOIDED ANY REFERENCES TO THE ROLE AND PUR-
POSE OF THE WARSAW PACT TREATY PER SE AND THE SOVIET-EAST
EUROPEAN MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE TREATIES, OR TO THE
"BREZHNEV DOCTRINE." IN BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO ROMANIA
BEFORE THE MEETING, NOVEMBER 22-24, HE EMPHASIZED THE NEED
FOR "COHESION" BY THE WARSAW PACT STATES IN ALL FIELDS,
USING SUCH PHRASEOLOGY AS "FRATERNAL INTERACTION."
CEAUSESCU, WHO IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS DURING THE VISIT
REITERATED ROMANIAN INSISTENCE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF
EQUALITY AND NON-INTERFERENCE, SUCCESSFULLY RESISTED
ANY SUCH LANGUAGE BEING PLACED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT
SIGNED ON NOVEMBER 24, INDEED, THE STATEMENT WAS
NOTABLE FOR THE ABSENCE OF ANY MENTION OF THE WARSAW PACT
OTHER THAN A BRIEF REFERENCE TO THE FACT THAT THE INITIAL
PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE HAD COME FROM
"WARSAW PACT MEMBER STATES." THE SOVIETS THUS APPEAR TO
HAVE DEFERRED TO ROMANIAN SENSITIVITY REGARDING THE
STRENGTHENING OF MILITARY COOPERATION WITHIN THE PACT.

21. ON THE MILITARY SIDE, THE NEW WARSAW PACT CHIEF OF
STAFF, GENERAL GRIBKOV--WHO IS ALSO THE FIRST DEPUTY
CHIEF OF STAFF ON THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF--REPORTED ON
THE ACTIVITY OF THE PACT'S JOINT COMMAND, IN PLACE OF
THE THEN AILING COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, GENERAL YAKUBOVSKIY,
WHO SUBSEQUENTLY DIED ON NOVEMBER 30. INTERESTINGLY,
ROMANIAN AND HUNGARIAN MEDIA DESCRIBED GRIBKOV AS "FIRST
ACTING COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF." WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE
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MIGHT BE ONE AMONG OTHERS IN LINE TO SUCCEED YAKUBOVSKIY,
THE DUAL POSITIONS OF GRIBKOV WERE ALSO HELD BY HIS
PREDECESSOR, GENERAL SHTEMENKO, WHO DIED IN APRIL. THERE
IS NO INDICATION THAT THE ROMANIANS RAISED THEIR DECADE-

OLD PROPOSAL THAT TOP COMMAND POSITIONS IN THE PACT BE
ROTATED ON A NATIONAL BASIS. ROBINSON

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